We investigate the content, timing and relevance of firms' narrative disclosure about the effects of IFRS adoption in annual statutory financial statements and firm announcements to the stock exchange for 150 large listed Australian firms in the three-year period surrounding adoption (which occurred from 1 January 2005). We observe communication about changes in financial reports, even when the change relates to accounting rather than economic events. We record more disclosure by firms experiencing an adverse change in earnings, consistent with them being sensitive to signals about future earnings. When economic performance is stronger, firms provide less discussion of the accounting effects of IFRS. We also find the discussion of IFRS impact in both disclosure channels is value-relevant for firms with relatively higher levels of disclosure, providing evidence of the usefulness of transition disclosures. The Author(s) 2013.
Introduction
We investigate the disclosures made by 150 Australian listed firms during the three year period surrounding adoption of International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) (from 1 January 2005). We make use of a specific capital market and financial reporting event, namely the adoption of International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS), to examine the interaction of disclosure incentives arising from the institutional setting for financial reporting and those that can be linked to managers' incentives. The Australian institutional setting includes legally enforceable accounting standards with specific disclosure requirements, listing rules including the continuous disclosure requirements of the Australian Securities Exchange (ASX) and scrutiny by independent auditors and regulators, all of which can be expected to promote compliance and disclosure.
Nevertheless, the way firms respond to the mandatory requirements and the institutional setting will vary, reflecting their particular business and economic circumstances together with managers' incentives. On adoption of IFRS, firms had strong incentives to keep investors, analysts and other stakeholders informed during the transition process, to ensure the change to IFRS did not erroneously affect perceptions of a firm's prospects (Ernst and Young, 2003; Accountnet, 2004) .
However, disclosure also reflects managers' assessments of the costs and benefits of disclosure (Healy and Palepu, 2001 ), including such considerations as the perceived information value or usefulness to market participants.
The research questions we consider are as follows: What are the attributes and timing of firms' IFRS disclosures? To what extent do firms experiencing greater financial impact on earnings and equity from IFRS adoption provide more disclosure about the IFRS effects, given that IFRS is an accounting change, not a change in economic fundamentals? Do firms experiencing a larger negative impact on earnings and equity provide earlier disclosure and do they make greater use of more disclosure channels? Finally, is firm disclosure about IFRS impact beneficial, that is, is it value relevant for market participants?
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We find disclosure about the impact of IFRS increases over the three year period of our study, becoming more quantified in the adoption year as firms are better able to measure the impact of IFRS. On average, firms provide more disclosure about financial position, consistent with explaining IFRS effects on assets, liabilities and equity that carry forward and affect future financial ratios. Some firms made use of firm announcements to the ASX to communicate IFRS effects and there is more discussion of IFRS in the transition year compared to the adoption year. Firm announcements with discussion of IFRS effects were largely made after the financial year end date as part of the firm's earnings announcement.
We extend prior IFRS disclosure studies (Gallery et al. 2008; Kent and Stewart 2008; Palmer 2008 ) by considering a three year period, disclosure in financial statements and firm announcements to the ASX in 2005 and 2006 , and several measures of disclosure (total, performance, position, qualitative, quantitative, and key impact items). We show that firm disclosure about the impact of IFRS on financial position and performance is associated with the change in earnings on transition (an accounting change) and the change in earnings in the first year of use of IFRS (an economic change).
Consistent with studies showing managers are sensitive to the nature of the news to be explained (Bloomfield 2008; Brown and Tucker, 2010; Matsumoto et al., 2011), we find disclosure about IFRS impact is linked to firm incentives to explain financial position and performance. For firms with 'bad news', that is firms that experience a fall in earnings in the adoption year, disclosure about IFRS effects in financial statements increases as the IFRS financial impact on earnings and equity is larger.
Firm with 'good news' have relatively less incentive to provide explanations about IFRS effects. The relation between disclosure and IFRS impact is weaker for 'good news' firms and we find some evidence of less disclosure by firms experiencing a larger positive financial impact. The results suggest firms with poorer performance make relatively more use of disclosure about IFRS effects as they explain their results.
We also consider whether the disclosure provided is value relevant. Using models derived from Ohlson (1995) , we examine the association between share price, book 4 value of equity and earnings with IFRS impact disclosure. The latter includes both measures of the financial effect (the amount of difference between earnings and equity under AGAAP and IFRS) and measures of firm narrative disclosure about the impact.
By measuring disclosure in the adoption period, our results add to existing literature on the value relevance of IFRS compared to AGAAP (Goodwin et al. 2008; Clarkson et al. 2011; Chalmers et al. 2011) . Goodwin et al. (2008) report that transition differences in earnings and equity are not value relevant in Australian firms.
However, we find that the difference in earnings is value relevant in the transition year for firms providing more than the average disclosure about the impact of IFRS transition. Our results suggest beneficial effects for firms providing more detailed explanations of IFRS impact and confirm that transition disclosures have economic importance.
The evidence of our study are important because of the costs associated with the regulation of financial reporting and with firm disclosure. Our results on the relationship between firm incentives, mandatory accounting standards and firms' actual disclosures extend our understanding of how the financial reporting setting and firm incentives influence practice. Questions have been raised about the global application of IFRS and the effect of firm incentives and a country's institutional setting on the quality of reporting under IFRS (Christensen et al., 2008; ESMA, 2011; SEC 2011) . Our study is relevant to this debate and provides insights that may be useful for parties promulgating and enforcing accounting standards. It also contributes to the evaluation of the benefits of IFRS in Australia. The findings are relevant to countries engaged in or considering adoption of IFRS as regulators determine the extent to which mandatory disclosure requirements are necessary and useful.
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2.
Background and research predictions
Incentives for disclosure
There are many institutional factors that could affect firms' disclosures about the impact of IFRS for Australian firms. Mandatory standards (including AASB 1047
and AASB 101) promote disclosure about IFRS as firms seek to meet their compliance obligations. In addition, IFRS adoption was considered a major event in corporate Australia, promoting activity by preparers, auditors and market regulators (i.e., the ASX and ASIC) (Picker, 2006) . The combined effect of mandatory standards and the scrutiny of auditors and regulators can be expected to promote compliance with accounting standards and disclosure requirements.
While disclosure about the impact of IFRS was mandatory, many aspects of firms' disclosure remain discretionary. That is, firms have some degree of control over content and attributes of disclosure (i.e., amount, spread and type) as well as its timing. In addition, firms have some choice in channel of disclosure, for example, via earnings forecasts, earnings announcements, statutory financial statements, investor presentations and press releases. Given that managerial incentives may affect firms' disclosure (Healy and Palepu, 2001) we expect variation between firms in the content and timing of their IFRS disclosures and the use of different channels for such disclosure. Holland (1998; proposes that changes in financial data in firm accounts create a setting where firms have strong incentives (linked to the share price effects of information and consequently cost of capital) to provide information to prevent 'earnings surprises'. He argues that the magnitude of a change is important, not its direction. A change such as IFRS adoption creates uncertainty with regards to the impact on financial accounts and managers are likely to explain away this uncertainty.
However markets are generally more sensitive to 'bad news' compared to 'good news'. Firms are cautious when reporting earnings downgrades and losses because of the implications for analyst forecasts, future performance and consequent impact on share price (Graham et al. 2005) . Studies have shown poor performance brings about more detailed explanations (Bloomfield 2008) , longer conference calls to analysts (Matsumoto et al. 2011 ) and increase in the content of management discussion and 6 analysis reports (Brown and Tucker 2010) . Consistent with disclosure being important to external users, Barton and Mercer (2005) show the plausibility of firm explanations for poor performance affects judgements by analysts about future firm performance. Other studies report earlier disclosure of bad news, possibly to reduce litigation risk (Skinner 1994 (Skinner , 1997 Soffer et al. 2000; Kothari et al. 2009 ).
Thus we propose that firms' narrative disclosures about the impact of IFRS are linked to the adverse effect of IFRS adoption on the financial accounts (specifically, measures of earnings and book value of equity). Firms experiencing an adverse change have greater incentive to provide more explanation of the change, to ensure that capital market participants are fully informed about the reasons for the change so that their assessments of current position and performance and future prospects are accurate. IFRS effects may be observed in both earnings and equity (in the latter, through the flow of current earnings to retained earnings and directly through changes in measurement of assets and liabilities). We expect firms to focus on disclosure about adverse (i.e., downwards or negative) changes in earnings due to the primacy of reported earnings. We also expect more disclosure about adverse changes in book value of equity because equity values carry forward into the following year and form part of key performance ratios such as return on equity. However, an important aspect of our investigation is that the change in earnings at transition to IFRS is a book entry (i.e., a change from alteration to accounting recognition and measurement rules) not a change reflecting performance (i.e., a change in underlying firm economics).
Similarly, we propose earlier disclosure of IFRS effects for firms experiencing greater adverse IFRS financial impact. Early release of information will give market participants more time to absorb the information and avoid misunderstandings. This view is consistent with Grossman (1981) who argues that, to avoid the costs of adverse selection, all firms are expected to disclose information as quickly as possible. Diamond's (1985) proposition that firms adopt disclosure policies that result in private information search savings also fits with the argument that firms with the most to lose from non-disclosure (in our case, from investors misinterpreting the financial impact of IFRS) will make earlier disclosures, for example in their IFRS transition year rather than the adoption year. 7
Multiple disclosure media
Prior studies of Australian firms' IFRS transition disclosure show disclosure varies with firm attributes and incentives. Using a sample of 150 firms, Palmer (2008) reports more transition disclosure by larger firms, those with more leverage and firms audited by a Big 4 auditor. Gallery et al. (2008) extends the work of Palmer by considering a larger sample of 408 firms and using a detailed disclosure checklist (with a score range of 1-17) that measures quality of disclosure in the transition reconciliation statement and the accompanying narrative disclosure. The authors find the quality of disclosure is negatively associated with IFRS impact on profit and positively associated with firm size and change in profitability. The authors report that disclosure quality varies between industries and clients of Big 4 audit firms. Kent and Stewart (2008) use sentence counts to measure disclosure for 965 firms.
They argue that measures of the quantity of disclosure proxy for more detailed and thus more transparent disclosure. The authors conclude that IFRS transition disclosure is positively related to corporate governance indicators such as the number of board and audit committee meetings and choice of a Big 4 auditor.
Because statutory financial statements are not a timely medium for reporting information (Ball and Brown 1968) , some firms will make disclosure through other media to ensure information is communicated effectively (Gibbins et al. 1990 , Holland 1998 . Continuing our arguments above, we expect that firms experiencing greater adverse IFRS impact to use more communication channels and provide more disclosure to achieve greater transparency about the effect of transition to IFRS. When discussing mandatory reporting practices, corporate preparers have indicated that the statutory disclosures are finalised, approved by the board and audited. Firm announcements and investor presentations are then prepared, based on material in the statutory accounts (Tarca et al. 2011 ). Therefore we expect disclosure in firm announcements to complement (rather than substitute for) disclosure in the financial statements. 
3.
Design, sample and data
Sample selection
The Australian setting is appropriate for this study for several reasons. The domestic capital market, although relatively small, is highly developed with sophisticated participants and information exchange mechanisms. External sources of finance are important and the quality of firms' disclosures and communication with outsiders attracts a great deal of attention, both within firms and in the public domain. In Australia, IFRS adoption was mandatory for all reporting entities for financial years commencing 1 January 2005 and early adoption was not permitted. Sample firms were selected from the S&P ASX 200. Firms were required to be followed by at least three analysts (to include firms for which public disclosures are important) and to use AGAAP then IFRS. This reduced the sample to 150 and reflects the extent of analyst following of Australian firms.
Our sample is smaller than that used by Gallery et al. (2008) and Kent and Stewart (2008) 
Measurement of IFRS disclosure
We measured Researchers commonly use word or sentence counts to measure disclosure (Beattie et al. 2004 ). However, measures of magnitude are limited in what they can reveal about the nature of the underlying disclosure. We follow the approach of Palmer (2008) and Gallery et al. (2008) by using a self-constructed checklist to measure financial We justify not including the interim reports for the following reasons. First, interim reports are not provided to shareholders and therefore are distributed less widely than annual reports. Second, interim reports are not audited and only reflect an interim position. Third, a review of interim reports of some of the sample companies suggested that interim reports were not greatly used to convey IFRS information.
statement disclosure about IFRS effects. However, our checklist is more comprehensive than those used in the two prior studies. It has 11 categories, organised in three groups. They are: (A) Financial Performance #1 Revenue, #2
Expenses, #3 -#4 Profit; (B) Financial Position #5 Assets, #6 Liabilities, #7 Equity, #8 Total figures; and (C) IFRS comments #9 Impact, #10 Volatility, #11 Other.
Following Beattie et al. (2002; we consider three attributes of disclosure. We measure amount of disclosure by recording all items relating to IFRS impact in the relevant documents, spread of disclosure by using the three groups A, B and C above and type of disclosure by recording whether a disclosure item was qualitative or quantitative.
Based on the financial statement checklist (Appendix 1), a firm received one point each time a checklist item was discussed, that is, scores greater than one are possible for each item and the checklist has no maximum score. A firm was awarded one point for a qualitative disclosure with an additional one point for providing quantitative disclosure as well. Qualitative disclosures related to descriptive statements of fact or statements based on matters of judgement that did not include numerical estimation. Quantitative disclosures on the other hand referred to narrative disclosures that were supported by factual statements and numerical measurements.
Two coders, trained by the researchers, read all documents separately, recorded data to checklists, then compared their coding to each other's and reconciled any differences to improve reliability in the coding process (Behn et al. 2001) .
For firm announcements, we collected all documents lodged with the ASX in 2005 and 2006. 5 They were searched for mention of IFRS, then checked for usable content (e.g., IFRS discussion, not just the word IFRS). Disclosure in firm announcements was coded based on a simplified version of the checklist used to measure financial statement disclosure (Appendix 2). Since detailed information was already captured 12 in the financial statements, the aim when coding these firm announcements was to record any additional information provided.
In relation to the income statement, firms received one point for discussion of one element of the income statement and an additional point for discussion of one or more elements; one point if overall impact was discussed and another point if impact was quantified (consistent with Palmer (2008) who argues that quantification increases the quality of the disclosure); one point if impact for one or more segments was discussed and another point if an alternative income measure (i.e., a non-GAAP or proforma income measure) was discussed; one point if overall ratios were discussed and up to two more points if one or more individual ratios were discussed.
One more point was given if ratios relating to segments were discussed. A similar approach was followed for coding discussion of balance sheet information. In addition, comments about IFRS were scored, with up to two points given for discussion relating to each of the following: overall impact, volatility; other IFRS comments; alternative measures; and the 'standard' IFRS comment. 
Models
The following models are used to investigate whether firms' IFRS disclosures are related to the impact of IFRS adoption on earnings and equity. 
Eq (1) where The regression model, based on Brown et al. (1999) , is estimated using pooled data and fitted with various measures of disclosure as the dependent variable. The measures of disclosure include total disclosure, disclosure about financial position, financial performance, quantitative and qualitative disclosure, and disclosure about key items expected to be most affected by IFRS and IFRS comments disclosure. We include robust standard errors to correct for heteroscedasticity in the residuals.
14 We measure the financial impact of adoption of IFRS using the following variables. Gallery et al. (2008) , we predict a negative relationship between changes in earnings and equity at transition with IFRS disclosure. That is, firms experiencing a greater adverse change in earnings and equity on transition to IFRS are more likely to provide more disclosure. 8 We include the year dummy variables (Adopt, Transit) to detect changes in disclosure across the years (consistent with Brown et al. 1999 ). We predict positive coefficients for the dummy variables as we expect disclosure to increase over the 7 Horton and Serafeim (2009) calculate the difference between GAAP and IFRS earnings and equity at transition and deflate the earnings change by GAAP earnings and the equity change by book value of equity. In robustness tests, we re-run all our models with EarnTT andEquityTT deflated by book value of equity instead of total assets. The results for these models are qualitatively similar to those reported elsewhere in our study.period as firms become more certain of IFRS effects. There is an extensive disclosure literature that reports more disclosure by larger firms and those followed by more analysts (see for example, Craswell and Taylor 1992; Hossain and Adams 1995; Lang and Lundholm 1996; Brown et al. 1999 ). In addition, firms raising capital and with foreign exchange listings provide more disclosure (Hossain and Adams 1995; Meek, Roberts and Gray 1995) . Leverage may also be associated with disclosure (Christensen et al. 2009 ). Thus we include control variables for size (Size), number of analysts following the firm (Analysts), leverage (Leverage), capital raising (Issues) and foreign listing (ForList).
9 Because Gallery et al. (2008) suggest firms experiencing unexpected changes in earnings and losses provide more disclosure, we include a loss dummy variable (Loss). In our models changes in earnings is captured in the EarnTA variable.
Two industry dummy variables are included (Finance, Mining) because IFRS adoption (particularly IAS 39) may affect the results of firms in the financial sector and mining sector more than other firms (Goodwin et al. 2008; Barth et al. 2011) .
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Prior studies investigating transition disclosure and industry effects report mixed results. Kent and Stewart (2008) find an association between disclosure and being a firm in the finance or mining sector while Gallery et al. (2008) and Palmer (2008) find no such association.
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Finally, to explore the relevance of disclosure about IFRS impact, we use the price level model adopted in prior studies (Barth and Clinch 1998; Goodwin et al. 2008; Chalmers et al. 2011) , derived from Ohlson (1995) .
We have not included corporate governance variables as corporate governance is a complex concept not easily proxied by individual corporate governance variables (such as having a non-executive chair, proportion of independent directors or the number of meetings). To extend the work of Kent and Stewart (2008) would require identifying better proxies for corporate governance, which we considered beyond the scope of our paper. 10 Type of auditor is an important explanatory variable for disclosure in Gallery et al. (2008) , Kent and Stewart (2008) and Palmer (2008 We also consider the relevance of transition disclosure by identifying 'high disclosing' firms, using two approaches. In our primary tests, we identify high disclosing firms using the fitted models (Equation 1 in models for the high disclosing group shows that IFRS impact disclosure has assisted market participants to interpret the transition reconciliation amounts. In robustness tests, instead of the residuals we use firms' scores for total disclosure (Discls) in (a) the financial statements and (b) firm announcements to form the subgroups. [Insert Table 1 and 55% were made on or near the release of the full year preliminary financial statements (within a three day window). Only 29 announcements were stand-alone IFRS statements. They were released by 22 large firms, of which 10 were from the financial services sector. Of the 29, only 12 announcements were released on a day other than when the half-year or yearly results were released. On average, these 12 documents were lodged 35 days after the nearest financial period end. Thus, we conclude that firms were most likely to discuss the effects of IFRS adoption within their period-end disclosures. Separate documents and documents released prior to end of the financial period were rare. Table 2 shows the mean TotalCA disclosure is higher in transition year compared to adoption (11 compared to 7). Similar to financial statement disclosure, the proportion of qualitative disclosure is lower in the adoption year (7 qualitative versus 2 quantitative in the transition year; 3 qualitative versus 2 quantitative in the adoption year). Mean scores for PerformCA and PositionCA are similar within and between years. However, the range of scores is high, with TotalCA disclosure scores reaching a maximum of 81 in the transition year and 94 in the adoption year. In the subcategories of disclosure, one firm recorded the maximum score of 43 for IFRS comments (CommentsCA) in transition year and another recorded the maximum score of 47 for PerformCA disclosure in adoption year.
Results
Summary statistics
[Insert Table 2 about here]
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The summary statistics for the independent variables are provided in Table 3 . 13 The sample includes the largest Australian firms, with average market capitalization of AUD 2.0 billion at the transition year end. Firms vary in size from AUD 120.8 million to AUD 109.9 billion (Std. dev = 13.18 billion) indicating the sample includes a range of firms based on size. They are, on average, covered by seven analysts. Mean leverage is 53% and, on average, capital raising represents 4.9% of market value of equity in the period. The sample included 93 firm-years (20.7%) from the financial services sector and 45 firm-years (10%) from the mining sector.
Forty-five firms are cross-listed or traded on a foreign stock exchange and 26 firmyears (5.8%) incurred a loss in the study period.
For the transition year (AGAAP to IFRS), firms, on average, restated their equity at a lower value (∆EquityTT = -0.032) and their earnings at a higher value (∆EarnTT = 0.004). In the adoption year, based on opening and closing IFRS balances, firms experienced a mean increase in equity (∆EquityTA = 0.078) and earnings (∆EarnTA = 0.012).
[Insert Table 3 about here] Table 4 shows significant correlations between the various measures of disclosure. [Insert Table 4 about here] Table 6 presents the same models but with total disclosure in firm announcements (TotalCA)
Regression results
as the dependent variable. 
IFRS financial impact and disclosure
In the pooled model (Table 5 , Panel A) coefficients on ∆EarnTT and ∆EarnTA are negative and significant (-2.174, p<0.05 and -0.820, p<0.05), suggesting disclosure is higher for firms with a smaller change. That is, firms with more adverse (less positive) financial impact are likely to provide more disclosure compared to firms with less adverse (more positive) financial impact. We observe a similar pattern for disclosure in the firm announcements. In the pooled model (Table 6 , Panel A) coefficients on ∆EarnTT and ∆EarnTA are negative and significant (-0.305, p<0.10 and -0.214, p<0.01).
21
[Insert Tables 5 and 6 about here] In addition, we find the relationship of IFRS impact and disclosure is observed in the adoption year for financial statements and the transition year for firm announcements. Coefficients on ∆EarnTT and ∆EarnTA are negative and significant in the adoption year (-6.364, p<0.01; -2.334, p<0.01) for financial statement disclosure (Table 5 , Panel B). Table 6 (Panel B) shows that the relationship between disclosure in firm announcements and IFRS financial impact occurs earlier, and in both the transition and adoption years. Coefficients on ∆EquityTT and ∆EarnTA are negative and significant (-0.198, p<0.05 and -0.340, p<0.01) in the transition year model and ∆EquityTA is negative and significant (-0.073, p<0.05) in the adoption year. This result suggests that firm announcements are used to provide earlier communication of IFRS information.
Disclosure by 'bad news' firms
To investigate the effect for firms experiencing a positive change (earnings increases) compared with those experiencing a negative change (earnings decreases), we split the sample based on positive (good news) or negative (bad news) values for ∆EarnTA. 15 Table 5 In the models reported in Table 5 , the coefficient signs on the control variables are as expected. In the pooled model, the year dummies (Transit, Adopt) are positive and significant, indicating that firms make more disclosure in both the transition and adoption years, compared to the pre-transition year. We include additional variables in our models to control for other factors that may influence the relationship between disclosure and the financial impact of IFRS. We observe positive and significant coefficients on variables for size, analyst following, leverage and being a financial sector firm. These variables have been reported by Palmer (2008) , Gallery et al. (2008) and Kent and Stewart (2008) to be associated with higher levels of disclosure.
IFRS disclosure channels
The third prediction was that IFRS impact disclosures in firm announcements would complement the disclosure in the financial statements and that firms would use both the firm announcements and the financial statement disclosures to inform investors.
In the pooled model (Table 6 , Panel A), the coefficients on ∆EarnTT and ∆EarnTA are negative and significant (-0.305, p<0.10 and -0.214, p<0.01) Looking more generally about the use of firm announcements, we observe that larger firms, firms with higher leverage and those from the financial services sector have higher levels of IFRS impact disclosure (Table 6 ). This applies to both 'good' and 'bad news' firms. In addition, firms in the latter group that issue equity or belong to the mining sector are more likely to provide greater disclosure.
Robustness tests
In robustness tests (untabulated), we explored whether the models for total disclosure in financial statements (Model 5) and in firm announcements (Table 6) were sensitive to the measure of disclosure used. Using the checklist data, we calculated measures based on subcategories of disclosure relating to impact on performance and on position. We also measured quantitative disclosure and qualitative disclosure and disclosure about the key financial statement items likely to be affected by IFRS. All the models for financial statement disclosure yielded results consistent with those reported for the pooled model with total disclosure as the dependent variable (Table   5 , Panel A). That is, the coefficients on ∆EarnTT and ∆EarnTA are negative and significant in all pooled models, irrespective of the measure of disclosure used, indicating that, overall, disclosure is decreasing with IFRS impact on earnings.
Control variables were significant in the same pattern as reported in the pooled models in Table 5 .
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The results for robustness tests for models using disclosure in firm announcements also provided results consistent with those for the pooled total disclosure model (Table 6 , Panel A). The coefficients on ∆EarnTA were negative and significant in all pooled models, irrespective of the measure of disclosure. The coefficients for ∆EarnTT were negative and significant in the qualitative and quantitative disclosure models, but not in the position and performance models. As for financial statement disclosure, our results confirm that disclosure is decreasing with IFRS impact on earnings. Control variables were similarly significant to those reported in the pooled models in Table 5 . Table 7 reports the results of models investigating the value relevance of the financial impact on earnings and equity at transition from AGAAP to IFRS and whether the value relevance of these transition amounts is affected by the accompanying narrative disclosure about the impact of IFRS adoption. As discussed above, prior evidence is mixed as to whether reconciliation amounts themselves are value relevant, depending on firm attributes (such as their country of origin, size and industry sector) and the individual reconciliation items investigated.
Value relevance -IFRS disclosure
[Insert Table 7 Table 7 , Column A).
Next we consider whether transition reconciliation amounts ( and ) are more value-relevant for firms providing relatively more discussion of the transition amounts (i.e., more explanations about the financial impact of the transition to IFRS). As explained previously, the two subgroups are based on whether (Column E).
' TT Equity  is not significant for either group.
In robustness tests (untabulated) we form groups based on firms' total disclosure score in (a) the financial statements and (b) firm announcements. We re-run the models reported in Table 7 , Columns B-E. Results are qualitatively similar to those in Table 7 where ' TT Earn  is positive and significant for the positive residuals group only. Based on the findings above, we conclude that firms' narrative disclosures explaining the financial impact of adoption of IFRS transition were useful to market participants.
Conclusions
We investigated the content, timing and relevance of Australian firms' disclosure in annual statutory financial statements and firm announcements to the stock exchange Overall, the results show firms are sensitive to the need to ensure reported financial changes are understood by market participants, irrespective of the source of the changes (i.e., an accounting change compared to an economic change). Some firms used both financial statements and firm announcements to promote understanding of the impact of IFRS on reported position and performance. In addition, they made use of the relatively greater freedom of firm announcements (which are unaudited and do not follow a legally specified format) to provide additional and earlier information.
Our findings suggest that communication about changes to reported earnings was a priority, consistent with earnings being the metric of primary interest in capital markets. In some ways this focus is surprising, as earnings changes on transition are accounting changes (i.e., book entries only) and it is the IFRS impact on equity that carries forward to future years and affects ratio calculations. We observe more disclosure by firms experiencing an adverse change in earnings, consistent with firms being more sensitive about possible misinterpretations of negative signals about future earnings. We find more disclosure of IFRS accounting effects when economic performance is weaker, consistent with poorer performing firms seeking to justify their performance.
The results suggest that disclosure in financial statements and firm announcements are complementary, with the latter providing additional information to supplement disclosure in the financial statements. The timing of disclosure suggests that firms may be less constrained in discussions in ASX announcements compared with the statutory accounts. We generally examine the two channels separately and do not explore the interrelationship between the two. However, this issue is worthy of further investigation in future research.
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Finally, we conclude that narrative transition disclosures were not just a 'box ticking' exercise. Narrative disclosures in both financial statements and firm announcements 27 were useful to market participants in understanding the impact of the financial effect on transition. Thus, understanding the accounting impact of IFRS was likely to be important for predicting future earnings. The impact of IFRS on the analysis of company fundamentals is beyond the scope of this study but could be usefully investigated in subsequent research.
A limitation of our study is the relatively small sample size, reflecting the size of the Australian capital market. Due to the intensive nature of data collection, we include only annual statutory financial statements and one source of public announcements (those made to the stock exchange). While these are arguably the most important disclosure media, there may be other disclosures made in the period not captured in our study. Given our design, the results may not be generalizable to smaller firms or to other jurisdictions. Our findings are based on manual coding of disclosure. Despite controls over the coding process, measuring disclosure is a subjective process and thus may be measured with error. Nevertheless, our study contributes to an understanding of the impact of mandatory disclosure requirements and managerial incentives on firms' disclosure practices. This table reports the distribution of the disclosure scores calculated using the checklist in the Appendix 1. Scores reflect one point for every time a checklist item is discussed by the firm (qualitative disclosure) with an additional one point for providing quantitative disclosure as well in the year end financial statements. Only disclosure about the impact of adoption of IFRS is coded. PerformFS refers to disclosure about impact on financial performance, PositionFS refers to disclosure about impact on financial position, and CommentsFS refers to the IFRS comments. TotalFS is total amount of IFRS impact disclosure. QualitativeFS disclosures are descriptive statements of fact or opinion that do not include numerical estimation. QuantitativeFS disclosures are narrative statements that include numerical estimation. KeyItemsFS are IFRS impact disclosure in the financial statements about key items (financial instruments, share-based payment, employee entitlements, impairment, intangible assets and tax effects). Pre-transition is the financial year prior to IFRS adoption; Transition is the financial year when IFRS comparative data was prepared and reported at financial year end; Adoption is the first full year of IFRS adoption. This table reports the distribution of the independent variables. EquityTT refers to the change in the shareholders' equity as at the transition year end as a result of IFRS adoption. EarnTT refers to the change in the net profit after tax at the transition year end as a result of IFRS adoption. EquityTA refers to the change in the reported shareholders' equity between the transition and adoption years.
EarnTA refers to the change in the reported net profit after tax between the transition and adoption years. The variable Size is the natural logarithm of the market capitalization, Analysts refers to the number of analysts following the firm, Leverage is the ratio of total liability to total assets and Issues is the ratio of total proceeds from issues to market value of equity. Loss is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the firm has a negative net profit after tax, Finance (Mining) is an industry dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the firm is in the financial services (Mining) sector, and 0 otherwise. ForList is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the firm is traded on a foreign exchange, and 0 otherwise. to disclosure about impact on financial performance, PositionFS refers to disclosure about impact on financial position, and TotalFS = total amount of IFRS impact disclosure. PerformCA refers to disclosure about impact on financial performance, PositionCA refers to disclosure about impact on financial position, and TotalCA = total amount of IFRS impact disclosure. EquityTT refers to the change in the shareholders' equity as at the transition year end as a result of IFRS adoption. EarnTT refers to the change in the net profit after tax at the transition year end as a result of IFRS adoption. EquityTA refers to the change in the reported shareholders' equity between the transition and adoption years. EarnTA refers to the change in the reported net profit after tax between the transition and adoption years. The variable Size is the natural logarithm of the market capitalization, Analysts refers to the number of analysts following the firm, Leverage is the ratio of total liability to total assets and Issues is the ratio of total proceeds from issues to market value of equity. * indicates significance at 5% level. reports the results for the models for the transition and adoption years. EquityTA refers to the difference in the reported shareholders' equity between transition and adoption year. EarnTA is the difference in earnings between transition and adoption year. EquityTT refers to the change in the shareholders' equity as at the transition year end as a result of IFRS adoption. EarnTT refers to the change in the net profit after tax at the transition year end as a result of IFRS adoption. All independent variables (other than the intercept term) are predicted to have a positive relationship with disclosure. Adopt is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the observation is drawn from the adoption year, and 0 otherwise. Transit is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the observation is drawn from the transition year, and 0 otherwise. The variable Size is the natural logarithm of the market capitalization, Analysts refers to the number of analysts following the firm, Leverage is the ratio of total liability to total assets and Issues is the ratio of total proceeds from issues to market value of equity. Loss is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the firm has a negative net profit after tax and 0 otherwise, Finance (Mining) is an industry dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the firm is in the financial services (Mining) sector, and 0 otherwise. ForList is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the firm is traded on a foreign exchange, and 0 otherwise. ***, **, * indicates significance at the 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively, using a 1-tailed test when the predicted direction is indicated and 2-tailed test otherwise. This table reports regression models estimated using equation (1) for firm announcement disclosure scores in total. Panel A reports the results for models using the pooled sample comprising observations from all years. Panel B
reports the results for the models for the transition and adoption years. EquityTA refers to the difference in the reported shareholders' equity between transition and adoption year. EarnTA is the difference in earnings between transition and adoption year. EquityTT refers to the change in the shareholders' equity as at the transition year end as a result of IFRS adoption. EarnTT refers to the change in the net profit after tax at the transition year end as a result of IFRS adoption. All independent variables (other than the intercept term) are predicted to have a positive relationship with disclosure. Adopt is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the observation is drawn from the adoption year, and 0 otherwise. Transit is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the observation is drawn from the transition year, and 0 otherwise. The variable Size is the natural logarithm of the market capitalization, Analysts refers to the number of analysts following the firm, Leverage is the ratio of total liability to total assets and Issues is the ratio of total proceeds from issues to market value of equity. Loss is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the firm has a negative net profit after tax and 0 otherwise, Finance (Mining) is an industry dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the firm is in the financial services (Mining) sector, and 0 otherwise. ForList is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the firm is traded on a regulated US exchange, and 0 otherwise. ***, **, * indicates significance at the 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively, using a 1-tailed test when the predicted direction is indicated and 2-tailed test otherwise. The dependent variable is share price measured three months after year end. BVE is a firm's book value of equity at year end. NI is net profit. EquityTT refers to the change in shareholders' equity at the transition year end as a result of IFRS adoption. EarnTT refers to the change in net profit after tax at the transition year end as a result of IFRS when the dependent variable is total firm announcement disclosure. ***, **, * indicates significance at the 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively, using a 1-tailed test when the predicted direction is indicated and 2-tailed test otherwise.
